Study: Private equity managers’ incentives may be twice as high a previously thought
Mar 17th, 2010 | Filed under: Private Equity, Today's Post
Investors in alternative investments, like their mutual fund counterparts, are often accused of chasing performance. In the world of hedge funds, this means that managers are often thought to focus too much on monthly performance. And why not? Since most hedge funds are open-ended, they are always trying to impress potential investors. Positive monthly returns are music to a hedge fund marketer’s ears.
But what if the marketing process only happens once every three or four years? That’s the world faced by most private equity and real estate funds. Due to the illiquid nature of their holdings, these alternative investments need to open, raise capital, and close to new investments often within a few months. As you can imagine, this makes the performance of previous funds critical in the marketing of new funds.
You can almost say that an extra percent return for a private equity manager has a twofold effect on her compensation. One is direct, while the other (the ability to raise additional assets for future funds) is indirect. This is the premise behind a paper by Ji-Woong Chung, Berk Sensoy, Lea Stern, and Michael Weisbach of Ohio State University (“Incentives of Private Equity General Partners from Future Fundraising”).
According to the quartet, these indirect incentives are as large – sometimes even larger – than the much-heralded incentive fee itself (a.k.a. carried interest). So in a way, the incentives faced by private equity managers are actually twice as large as you think – especially for younger managers who often “give up promising careers in other fields such as investment banking to manage a relatively small fund.”
Previous studies have confirmed the axiom that fundraising success is related to historical performance. But according to the authors of this paper, none has reversed this equation and examined the effect of potential future funds on the incentives faced by PE managers right now.
But posting stellar returns doesn’t always help, according to the researchers. In fact, it only helps under two conditions: One is that the fund management company must be young (i.e. new). This makes intuitive sense. Investors have very little information on new managers, so the performance of their first or second fund really sets the tone for the marketing of future offerings.
The other condition under which a stellar first-fund return can drive future asset-raising success is scalability. The paper indicates that successful scalable strategies such as buyout funds are more likely to raise a ton of assets for a second fund than a less-scalable strategy such as venture capital.
To prove the point, Chung, Sensoy, Stern, and Weisbach look at nearly 10,000 private equity funds tracked by research firm Preqin (representing “70% of all capital ever raised by the private equity industry”). They extract about 1,700 buyout, VC and real estate funds for their study.
The chart below (created with data from the paper) confirms the assumption that buyout funds are more scalable than VC or real estate – regardless of the performance (which was pegged at around 16% p.a. for all three categories).
But once you add in the effect of performance on initial and secondary attempts at starting funds, future fund raising potential can change significantly.
The chart below from the paper shows that the ratio of “indirect incentives” (future fundraising) to “direct incentives” (carried interest on current fund) can be as high as 1.2 for rookie managers who plan to stay in the game for the long haul (defined as eventually launching another 4 funds).
The horizontal axis of this chart represents the current fund (first through fifth) while “N” represents the number of future funds still to be raised. So, if a manger is on their fourth fund and plans 5 more, then there is little future benefit from hitting the lights out on the current fund. For better or for worse, investors have already developed an opinion of the manager. So there is little incremental respect the manager can earn by producing good returns in the current period.
So the bottom line is that while the private equity portfolio manager might get excited about the carried interest when returns are good, the fund’s marketer can be equally as excited about the potential to raise assets down the line a little.
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